Delivering the Bomb: The Spread of Nuclear Delivery Systems and the Global Non-proliferation Order (Book Project)
How do states build their nuclear forces? What about the global nuclear non-proliferation regime allows states to proliferate the means of nuclear delivery? Most studies of nuclear proliferation explain why states build the nuclear bomb and how they do it. What they miss, however, is how states develop the wherewithal to deliver these nuclear weapons – a crucial part of operationalizing any nuclear force. My book project posits an original framework to understand how states build the forces to deliver their nuclear weapons. It addresses the empirical puzzle of why the non-proliferation order – instead of constraining the spread of the means of nuclear delivery – enables it. I argue that there exists a Zone of Ambiguity in this order that consists of definitional ambiguity, multipurpose technology, and an indeterminate legal and normative framework. This Zone creates a permissive environment for the transfer of technology related to the means of nuclear delivery through three enabling logics. Each of these logics – economic, geopolitical, and alliance-related – highlight different political interests that states have in proliferating nuclear delivery vehicles.
To demonstrate the argument, I conduct historical case studies based on the nuclear force development of three states – the United Kingdom, France, and India. I use newly declassified material from the archives of multiple states to bring forward new historical evidence and uncover an international history of the development of nuclear forces. In the process, I also trace the historical trajectory of the evolution of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime as it relates to the means of nuclear delivery.
Journal Articles
“Explaining the Proliferation of Nuclear Delivery Vehicles,” Security Studies, Volume 38, Issue 3, (forthcoming)
How and why do nuclear delivery vehicles proliferate? This article identifies a permissive environment for the proliferation of nuclear delivery systems in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. There are three drivers of this dynamic: First, the multipurpose/dual-use nature of the technology to deliver nuclear weapons; second, the definitional obscurity in the non-proliferation regime about what constitutes a ‘nuclear weapon’; and third, the exclusion of any legally-enforceable legislation on delivery systems in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Drawing from newly declassified sources from archives in India, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, I argue that these drivers have permitted the transfer of nuclear delivery technology despite states’ purported commitments to non-proliferation. I establish the argument by using historical case studies of India’s acquisition of nuclear-capable Jaguar aircraft from the United Kingdom and space/missile technology from France. This study furthers our understanding nuclear proliferation by highlighting the different pathways that future proliferators might use to spread/develop nuclear delivery systems.
“‘The Courtroom of World Opinion’: Bringing the International Audience into Nuclear Crises,” Global Studies Quarterly, Volume 1, Issue 4, December 2021, ksab028.
What role does the international audience play in moderating nuclear crisis behavior? Scholars treat nuclear crises as dyadic interactions between two sides. This article argues that states do not only interact with each other during a nuclear crisis, they also signal to a third actor–the international audience. Two related reasons explain this. First, states care about a positive international reputation. Second, states also care about the material benefits of maintaining a good reputation with the international audience, which possesses the leverage to sanction. I use empirical evidence from the Kargil War (1999) between India and Pakistan to demonstrate this dynamic.
“Warring from the Virtual to the Real: Assessing the Public’s Threshold for War over Cyber Security,” Research and Politics 4 (2): 1–8. (with Sarah Kreps)
Accusations of Russian hacking in the 2016 US presidential election has raised the salience of cyber security among the American public. However, there are still a number of unanswered questions about the circumstances under which particular policy responses are warranted in response to a cyber-attack and the public’s attitudes about the conditions that justify this range of responses. This research investigates the attributes of a cyber-attack that affect public support for retaliation. It finds that cyber-attacks that produce American casualties dramatically increase support for retaliatory airstrikes compared to attacks with economic consequences. Assessments of attribution that have bipartisan support increase support to a lesser extent but for a broader range of retaliatory measures. The findings have important implications for ongoing debates about cyber security policy.
Working Papers
Leave Us Out of It: Keeping Third-Party Nuclear Forces Out of Arms Control
Defining the Bomb: Negotiating Uncertainty into the Making of the Global Nuclear Order (with J. Luis Rodriguez)
Whose Democracy is it Anyway? Public Opinion and Crisis Decision-making in India (with Shubha Kamala Prasad)